Looking at the reasons why North Korea has embarked on a nuclear program, it is clear that they do not pose as big a threat as initially it may have seemed. Nuclear proliferation is not desirable and despite unverified claims they have links in a nuclear black market, the fact that the program stems from the insecure perception in regards to its regime and economy, suggests that a solution is attainable. It also reveals a level of rationality (distinct from justification) in the decision making in the Jong-il regime.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) maintains a difficult position in Northeast Asia. North Korea has its roots in a history fraught with tension that very much shapes the current perceptions. Relations with the United States has been full of tension, hostility and distrust. China stands as the closest ally of North Korea, yet even then, North Korea cannot rely on China to act in accordance with Pyongyang’s interests. Russia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has maintained some level of relations with the DPRK, nevertheless its preference for relations with the South are evident. The process of breaching the divide between the North and South has been slow and much divergence still exists. The marked difference in standards between the two sides is also indicative of the great divide between two nations. North Korea is isolated and without allies. The nuclear program stems from this insecure position.
The reasons for re-starting of the nuclear program are on premised on two grounds – the strategic isolation, intensified as a result of hostile US policy, as well as, the need to seek economic relief. There is a perception of an impending threat of military action and breach of sovereignty at the hands of the United States. The policy direction of the United States, most particularly from the Bush Administration post September 11, 2001, has been hard-lined and coercive in its dealings with ‘rogue regimes.’[1] North Korea was placed as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and discussed in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review, thus signaling the willingness of the United States to engage in pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the state if tensions were to escalate.[2] The perception in Pyongyang was one of an aggressive and militarily inclined United States: one with North Korea in its sights. The Bush Administration’s policy challenges the self-sufficiency, sovereignty and security of North Korea.[3] Statements from the DPRK indicate that in the interests of deterring an attack on its sovereignty, it has sought to obtain nuclear weapons to counter this threat to the freedom of the Jong-il regime.[4] The nuclear program, announced in October 2002, therefore provides North Korea with a deterrent to counter its insecure position. North Korea is not in a position to launch nuclear weapons - both from a technological standpoint and political. To launch an attack would result in the definite annihilation of the regime. This is at odds with the goal of the regime's longevity.
The economic situation in North Korea is also troubling. With failed attempts at reform, the economy is spiraling downwards. North Korea, despite its juche ideology of self-reliance, is being propped up by external aid and assistance.[5] In order to rectify the situation, it must engage the outside world and move toward economic change. North Korea appeared to be committed to the process of reform through engagement in the early 1990s. Yet, nevertheless launched a three-stage missile in 1998 – demonstrating its ability to launch an attack ‘beyond its shores.’[6] This is indicative of the sentiment in Pyongyang that economic reform will not occur at the expense of its security and strategic interests. Similarly, the kind of assistance that North Korea needs in economic terms may be better served by aid from organizations such as the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank. Yet, the requisite financial transparency that would be required by such lenders would serve to ‘promote political change.’[7] When faced with such a prospect, North Korea is inclined to seek options for economic relief that do not compromise the control of the regime. [8]
Removing the threats to stability that produce the insecurity that drives the nuclear program is the best method of overcoming the situation. North Korea maintains a difficult position: it perceives great hostilities and danger from the United States, yet requires their assistance to overcome its internal problems. Pyongyang has maintained, however, that it does not desire to remain a nuclear power and that it still considers a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula to be in its best interests.[9] In addition, the DPRK has indicated it is their desire for reunification of Korea, yet under negotiated terms, as opposed to imposed unification as a result of an overthrow of the regime. The problems of inducing economic change without endangering the regime will not be solved quickly or easily. With assistance and assurance, the DPRK may find an incentive to trust and thus engage adversaries that will ease the process of economic integration and stabilization. (Reform in China is a case in point). Until this is done, nuclear weapons are seen as imperative to survival.
Anyway, that was part of an essay. We've had so much stuff in here that was written by other people (news articles etc) I thought I would add something that one of us had done ourselves.
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[1] This signalled a shift away from the strategy of engagement that had been undertaken by the Clinton Administration and seemingly maintained in the early months of the Bush Administration. For further information refer to: J. Hwang, “Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush administrations in Comparative Perspective,” World Affairs, Summer 2004, Volume 167 Issue 1, p.15(15).
[2] See G.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, accessed online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> 29 January 2002
and D. Kang, “Threatening, But Deterrence Works,” Chapter 2 of V. Cha and D. Kang, (eds.) North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), p.57
[3] W. Perry, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” United States of America: Department of State, accessed online at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html> 12 October 1999.
[4] Refer to statement of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yong-il as quoted in G. McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, (Sydney: Random House, 2004), p.174-5.
[5] Such as from, for example, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and United Nations food program, “Background Note: North Korea,” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, accessed online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm> August 2004.
[6] P. Maass, “Open Sesame: North Korea Opens Up” New Republic, 12 June 2000, p.14
[7] Ibid. p.16
[8] For further discussion on the nature of economic problems in North Korea, refer to S. Harrison, “Reform by Stealth,” Chapter 4 of Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.25.
[9] As one North Korean official states, “the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is the general goal of the DPKR. It is not our goal to have nuclear weapons. The denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula was our initiative and it is our consistent stand and desire of all Koreans to realize it.” As quoted in G. McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, op.cit. p.174
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) maintains a difficult position in Northeast Asia. North Korea has its roots in a history fraught with tension that very much shapes the current perceptions. Relations with the United States has been full of tension, hostility and distrust. China stands as the closest ally of North Korea, yet even then, North Korea cannot rely on China to act in accordance with Pyongyang’s interests. Russia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, has maintained some level of relations with the DPRK, nevertheless its preference for relations with the South are evident. The process of breaching the divide between the North and South has been slow and much divergence still exists. The marked difference in standards between the two sides is also indicative of the great divide between two nations. North Korea is isolated and without allies. The nuclear program stems from this insecure position.
The reasons for re-starting of the nuclear program are on premised on two grounds – the strategic isolation, intensified as a result of hostile US policy, as well as, the need to seek economic relief. There is a perception of an impending threat of military action and breach of sovereignty at the hands of the United States. The policy direction of the United States, most particularly from the Bush Administration post September 11, 2001, has been hard-lined and coercive in its dealings with ‘rogue regimes.’[1] North Korea was placed as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and discussed in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review, thus signaling the willingness of the United States to engage in pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the state if tensions were to escalate.[2] The perception in Pyongyang was one of an aggressive and militarily inclined United States: one with North Korea in its sights. The Bush Administration’s policy challenges the self-sufficiency, sovereignty and security of North Korea.[3] Statements from the DPRK indicate that in the interests of deterring an attack on its sovereignty, it has sought to obtain nuclear weapons to counter this threat to the freedom of the Jong-il regime.[4] The nuclear program, announced in October 2002, therefore provides North Korea with a deterrent to counter its insecure position. North Korea is not in a position to launch nuclear weapons - both from a technological standpoint and political. To launch an attack would result in the definite annihilation of the regime. This is at odds with the goal of the regime's longevity.
The economic situation in North Korea is also troubling. With failed attempts at reform, the economy is spiraling downwards. North Korea, despite its juche ideology of self-reliance, is being propped up by external aid and assistance.[5] In order to rectify the situation, it must engage the outside world and move toward economic change. North Korea appeared to be committed to the process of reform through engagement in the early 1990s. Yet, nevertheless launched a three-stage missile in 1998 – demonstrating its ability to launch an attack ‘beyond its shores.’[6] This is indicative of the sentiment in Pyongyang that economic reform will not occur at the expense of its security and strategic interests. Similarly, the kind of assistance that North Korea needs in economic terms may be better served by aid from organizations such as the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank. Yet, the requisite financial transparency that would be required by such lenders would serve to ‘promote political change.’[7] When faced with such a prospect, North Korea is inclined to seek options for economic relief that do not compromise the control of the regime. [8]
Removing the threats to stability that produce the insecurity that drives the nuclear program is the best method of overcoming the situation. North Korea maintains a difficult position: it perceives great hostilities and danger from the United States, yet requires their assistance to overcome its internal problems. Pyongyang has maintained, however, that it does not desire to remain a nuclear power and that it still considers a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula to be in its best interests.[9] In addition, the DPRK has indicated it is their desire for reunification of Korea, yet under negotiated terms, as opposed to imposed unification as a result of an overthrow of the regime. The problems of inducing economic change without endangering the regime will not be solved quickly or easily. With assistance and assurance, the DPRK may find an incentive to trust and thus engage adversaries that will ease the process of economic integration and stabilization. (Reform in China is a case in point). Until this is done, nuclear weapons are seen as imperative to survival.
Anyway, that was part of an essay. We've had so much stuff in here that was written by other people (news articles etc) I thought I would add something that one of us had done ourselves.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] This signalled a shift away from the strategy of engagement that had been undertaken by the Clinton Administration and seemingly maintained in the early months of the Bush Administration. For further information refer to: J. Hwang, “Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush administrations in Comparative Perspective,” World Affairs, Summer 2004, Volume 167 Issue 1, p.15(15).
[2] See G.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, accessed online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> 29 January 2002
and D. Kang, “Threatening, But Deterrence Works,” Chapter 2 of V. Cha and D. Kang, (eds.) North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003), p.57
[3] W. Perry, “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” United States of America: Department of State, accessed online at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html> 12 October 1999.
[4] Refer to statement of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kim Yong-il as quoted in G. McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, (Sydney: Random House, 2004), p.174-5.
[5] Such as from, for example, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and United Nations food program, “Background Note: North Korea,” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, accessed online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm> August 2004.
[6] P. Maass, “Open Sesame: North Korea Opens Up” New Republic, 12 June 2000, p.14
[7] Ibid. p.16
[8] For further discussion on the nature of economic problems in North Korea, refer to S. Harrison, “Reform by Stealth,” Chapter 4 of Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.25.
[9] As one North Korean official states, “the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is the general goal of the DPKR. It is not our goal to have nuclear weapons. The denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula was our initiative and it is our consistent stand and desire of all Koreans to realize it.” As quoted in G. McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, op.cit. p.174
