Reasons for Nuclear Proliferation in North Korea

[Amara]

This is the topic of my thesis that I am writing this year. I presented the synopsis yesterday but thought I would post the outline that I read as some people like PuffnScruff were interested as well as providing a means to gain constructive responses/criticisms or some directional ideas.

As it was written as an aid to my presentation, it is quite rough and not always in complete sentences - not to mention dumbed down a bit as it is not an academic piece.... but you'll get the idea I think.

• Proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Provide an answer to the question of why they would decide to build a nuclear arsenal.
• Answer lies in one simple notion: security. Yet what you define as security contains two parts. 1) Regime Survival 2) State Survival. In other cases/situations, you may find that these are distinct areas, although in regards to North Korea the two are entwined, but for convenience I’m writing them separately.
• Essentially this security paradigm lends support for the realist explanation of nuclear proliferation, which will involve a particular focus on the role of US policy in shaping North Korea’s nuclear program.
• Really what I am hoping to explain is why the hard-lined approach that US policymakers have had and continue to employ in regards to North Korea will not prevent or contain the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.
• In addition bilateral engagement based on openness and trust between the two countries is essential in order to stabilise the situation and assuage the insecurity. As accompanied by the reliable and sufficient delivery of economic assistance as agreed to which is an important part of security of the NK state

• First chapter will provide a brief outline of the relationship between the two countries – very brief and only really insofar as it relates to the current situation. Just to set the scene of tension between the two – the hostility, the lack of trust. The very different approaches, in terms of economic and political ideology – North Korea of course being a communist dictatorship, built on the juche system.
• The most significant part of this chapter, however, is what I believe to be the starting point of the latest nuclear crisis – the built up, production and outcome of the Agreed Framework of 1994.
• This will involve a review of the contents of the Agreement, which was the cessation of North Korea’s nuclear program – shutting down nuclear facilities in return for the construction of Light Water Reactors, oil/food delivery and steps towards normalisation of political relations.
• At the time the agreement satisfied the situation and did have the potential to contain proliferation on the peninsula. Although the outcome in practice was much different. It is debatable who breached what first – but NK did ‘secretly’ restart its program, the US poorly performed its obligations. The construction of the LWR were heavily delayed and remained notably cynical and hostile towards the Jong-il regime.
• As far as determining reasons for the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, it boils down to the basis on which it was built – foundations are of distrust and hostility. How can we expect a liberal cooperative approach to work when it is built on such notions?Some might say it was doomed from the beginning, yet there was there was a particular event, something had to happen in order to bring the issues to the forefront.

• Second chapter predominately focuses on the US policies post-September 11, wont detail but they leave no doubt that the role of nuclear weapons and the preparedness for conflict are at the forefront of international relations. Including the labelling of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” - a very public denunciation of the Jong-il regime.
• Entwined in that is the precedent of Iraq – the example of the willingness to act on its pre-emptive, confrontational, hard-lined approach to dealing with “rogue” regimes.
• In particular, I want to focus on how this may have been perceived by North Korea – read into that through the withdrawal from the NPT, and removal of IAEA. This is where fears for “regime survival” in NK reach a pinnacle
• Then there’s the media battle between the two states, which displays the heightening hostility.
• Really a chapter on threat perceptions, the interplay of policy and the reactions.
• Self-defence, the protection of sovereignty and most importantly – continuing survival of the Jong-il regime become the key factors which lead to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons as a measure to guard against what it perceives as a real and immediate security threat from the US.

• As third chapter – state survival. Question that pops up within the literature - are they using this “nuclear guise” as a means to gain economic concessions? Playing the nuclear card to get the attention of the US and manipulate in order to better their situation, using weapons as a bargaining chip.
• As far as all that goes, I feel that is still a part of the rubric of security. Looking at the situation of North Korea, it goes without question that they need that kind of economic help as was laid out in the Agreed Framework in order to survive and maintain the “state" internally.
• Certainly very snake like behaviour, but as many have suggested, when really backed into a corner, there aren’t really many other options available to a state like NK. This state survival is really a secondary issue to that of regime survival, because if they don’t have the regime, there’s no state to maintain – the NK state is the regime.
• Raw political terms, it’s a clear case of protecting the regime and acquiring what resources in doing so.
• So, the crux of this chapter is the question of the rationality of North Korea’s decision to go nuclear. This involves taking a good look at North Korea – it is a very small, isolated and poor state. Economically and militarily weak. What choices does it have up against a superpower such as the US? What other possible motivations could there be, e.g. terrorist black market trade (which smells like bullshit).
• Looking at North Korea reveals the uniqueness of its situation. It shows that regime and state survival are very much one and the same. Demonstrate that point, compare to Iraq. When you topple the regime – government can be reformed yet with NK, topple the regime and there is nothing left, will be absorbed by South. No one to secure the state, reunification process would begin. So in arming itself, is really a preservation of both – securing both.

• If this is the direction, the perception, the possible motivations – where do we go from here? Fourth chapter.
• The DPRK has been firm on its claim that it has no long-term desire to be a nuclear weapon state. The North Korean objectives are however to maintain the strength and security of its regime, free of impending security threats from what it sees as an “imperialistic superpower.” Brings us back to the US, will the hard-lined stance achieve the objectives of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula?
• As the situation has evolved we’ve seen it go into multilateral talks, which are still continuing. I don’t really intend to discuss the talks in any great detail, except perhaps to highlight the central role that China will play and even that it could be seen as the reason for the multi as opposed to bilateral talks. Being the central player in the North East Asian region, the direction China takes is very important. Their support does much to keep Jong-il in power.
• However, as it appears that the development of nuclear weapons occurred on account of insecurity both in regards to regime and state survival largely if not solely determined by the US. So a simple solution, as it would seem, would be a security assurance – a willingness to say the Jong-il regime is “safe” from US invasion. The problem with that, however, is that the US wont say that because quite simply they don’t want Jong-il in power.
• Yet when faced with two possibilities – the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear warfare versus the acceptance of ideologically different regime – it would seem a review of the hard-lined status would be a more viable way of achieving the goal of non-proliferation.

 

[Rukas]

I think you have it pretty much covered. I think it may help however if you discuss North Korea’s foreign policy and the way it deals with other countries in its region and outside, and how it portrays itself.

To me North Korea is almost like the rebellious little kid on the block that is trying to prove how hard it is. It’s foreign relations are definitely very defensive and I think if you outlined this and gave some examples and reasons it would serve well to establish a motive behind their actions and show their reasoning, whether or not you agree with it.

 

[Amara]

I think you have it pretty much covered. I think it may help however if you discuss North Korea’s foreign policy and the way it deals with other countries in its region and outside, and how it portrays itself.

To me North Korea is almost like the rebellious little kid on the block that is trying to prove how hard it is. It’s foreign relations are definitely very defensive and I think if you outlined this and gave some examples and reasons it would serve well to establish a motive behind their actions and show their reasoning, whether or not you agree with it.

Yeah, as far as NK's foreign policy is concerned, I can only really discuss it insofar as it relates to the nuclear program. The third chapter where it says something like an extensive look at North Korea will probably include things like that - the isolationism in the sense that it does not have any strong alliances. China does, to an extent support North Korea, although this merely serves as a smoke screen - by propping up NK, China keeps attention away from itself, as is the case in China's dealings with Pakistan. In addition, I will expand on the withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the removal of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which are both highly controversial decisions with international implications.

The main cause for concern in regard to the nuclear program is the policies and interaction with the US - which as you said is defined by defensive, hostile and rebellious streaks. On that point, I am choosing to be deliberately cautious, as most of the sources that we receive which portray NK in that light have a tendency to be quite bias. One of the most interesting aspects of the NK case is the media battles - the rhetoric used. Remember NK was deemed "evil" "reclusive" "suspicious" and the like - very strong, descriptive and emotive words, similarly NK lashes back with words such as "Yankee imperialists." They are both very hostile and very stubborn - neither wants to lose face - they both have something to prove.

Although on that note perhaps it is worth considering the willingness of NK to engage in talks with the US - there is a definite willingess to resolve this conflict and proceed to a normalisation of diplomatic relations. In addition, some of the statements issued from NK officials have appeared to me to be very straight forward, rational and most definately lack the secretive, evil and manipulative characteristics which we are often lead to believe NK possesses.

One more thing, the essence of the defensive policies stem from the fact that regime and state survival are not ensured.

 

[PuffnScruff]

Thank you for taking the time to post this up. looks like it would be a very good read when its all finished. i think you've done a good job staying neutral and looking at things from both points of view.

donald rumsfield has been quoted saying that if the u.s. knows that a country has wmd's we (the u.s.) would not go to war with that country but if we know that a country does not have wmds but has a hostile regime we would go in and take them out basically, not in those exact words. what is your opinion on the idea of north korea starting up developing nuclear weapons to scare the u.s. from starting a war with them?

 

[Amara]

Thank you for taking the time to post this up. looks like it would be a very good read when its all finished. i think you've done a good job staying neutral and looking at things from both points of view.

donald rumsfield has been quoted saying that if the u.s. knows that a country has wmd's we (the u.s.) would not go to war with that country but if we know that a country does not have wmds but has a hostile regime we would go in and take them out basically, not in those exact words. what is your opinion on the idea of north korea starting up developing nuclear weapons to scare the u.s. from starting a war with them?

Looking at it from the realist perspective, I believe that it is an entirely rational response for NK to develop nuclear weapons (although it is worth pointing out for people unfamiliar with realist theory, there is a substantial difference in saying it is rational as opposed to saying it is morally right or justifiable. Never in my mind is the possession of nuclear weapons justifiable, but thats another story). The reasons why relate to notions of sovereignty and state security. It is not the role of the US to determine which regimes are acceptable. Jong-il may be a questionable person controlling a state comprised of policies and ideologies different from that of the western world - yet that does not give any state the right to undermine principles at the heart of international law, neither does that give any state the right to undermine its treaty obligations or to publically denounce that state. The real question I feel that is relevant is, why states such as NK are hostile and from there design solutions to lessen the hostility and tension. As the state and regime are threatened, naturally when faced with the prospect of invasion - retaliation and the production of an arsenal for self-defence hit the forefront of the agenda. Therefore, the development of trust and assurance are what NK needs... although I realise it is unlikely that the Jong-il regime will ever be accepted so as to be granted any kind of assurance or freedom from the external threats.